Brian Claypool Press Conference for Criminal Investigation of Orange County CPS

The New Mafia: A Family Court Crime Family (video)

Karin Wolf, Plaintiffs against Gerald C. Escala : Request for Judicial Notice on United Nations Commission of Status of Women Report

IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY ________________________________________________________________________
Karin Wolf, et al.,
Gerald C. Escala, et al.,
Case no. 2:14-cv-05985





Plaintiff Karin Elena Wolf, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, respectfully requests that the Honorable Court take Judicial Notice of the following adjudicative facts and/or public records in support of Karin Elena Wolf’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus. As grounds therefore, Karin Elena Wolf states as follows: Judicial notice is a means by which adjudicative facts not seriously open to
dispute are established as true without the normal requirement of proof by evidence Dippin’Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution, LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004);Fed. R.Evid. 201(a) and (b); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(a).  Adjudicative facts are facts that are relevant to a determination of the claims presented in a case. Id. One category of adjudicative facts subject to judicial notice includes facts that are “generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)). Such judicially-noticed facts have been described as being “of breathtaking variety.” Id.(collecting cases). Another category includes facts that can be accurately and readily


determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid.
201(b)(1). A court also may take judicial notice of public records. Universal Express, Inc.v. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 177 Fed. Appx. 52, 53 (11th Cir. 2006).

Judicial Notice of appropriate adjudicative facts may be taken at any stage in a proceeding, including at the summary judgment stage. Dippin’ Dots, Inc., 369 F.3d at 1204; Fed. R. Evid. 201(f). Courts have wide discretion to take Judicial Notice of facts. Id.; Fed. R. Evid. 201(c).

Because the following adjudicative facts and/or public records relevant to a determination of the claims presented in this case are generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and are not subject to reasonable dispute, judicial notice should be taken of them: 1. In its just-released 2016 report, the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) recognizes women losing custody as an international form of discrimination against women, i.e. systemic male entitlement. It is now on the international map as a human rights issue. The CSW 2016 report officially recognizes “discrimination against women resulting in the loss of child custody to abusive fathers”. [see attached report, p. 55-56, notably # 7 (c)(f)(g)(i)(j) and (k)].

Plaintiff was included as one of over 150 women whose child custody case was considered by the United Nations here. 2. New Jersey Senate Judiciary Committee hearing held on May 23, 2016 on Gov. Chris Christie’s plan to award tenure to state Superior Court Judge Paul X. Escandon, where several women’s advocacy groups and women came forth to argue against it and testify they were discriminated against by Judge Escandon in New Jersey Family Court. 


In addition, Monmouth County Assignment Judge Lisa P. Thorton was caught lying under oath during the hearing. See attached – Custody Rulings Stymie Tenure Nomination While 7 Others Pass, by Michael Booth, New Jersey Law Journal, May 24, 2016. See attached – Christie Monmouth Judge Nominee in Trouble by Bob Jordan, Asbury Park Press May 31, 2016.

Dated: ________________


   Respectfully submitted,


Karin Elena Wolf

ACP 2312

P.O. Box 1110

Albany, NY 12201-1110

In Loving Memory of Little Angel Anna Celeste Lowe (short video)

. . . And God Bless natural mother, Jamie Mercer, and brother, of Louisiana

Please ponder where the        research      below        came from, and how many families, mothers, fathers, and children, have been involuntarily         “sacrificed” for the research/lobbyist funding of the time.

That being said, the        in general phenomenon of stepparent abuse is logical, compelling, and profound, as who could truly love children as their own when they are not of the same body.  Exceptions, and many, probably DO exist.  Sadly, however, there have been so many cases that        “support” The Cinderella effect (absent new wave, pseudo-scientific, “zoological,” “evolutionary”  babble).  It appears from the facts, as presented, in the Justice4theChildren video above, however, that sweet little angel, Anna Celeste Lowe was not spared as an “exception” to the experimental research routine policy and procedure in American, Australian, British, and Scottish family/CPS/carer courts conducting radical Eugenics-based       projects and “New” pogroms on “different” populations.


The “Cinderella effect”

(Stepparent Abuse)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


“This article is about parenting. For the effect with the same name in semiconductors, see floating body effect. (???)”

In evolutionary psychology, the Cinderella effect is the alleged higher incidence of different forms of child-abuse and mistreatment by stepparents than by biological parents. It takes its name from the fairy tale character Cinderella.

Evolutionary psychologists describe the effect as a remnant of an adaptive reproductive strategy among primates in which males frequently kill the offspring of other males in order to bring their mothers into estrus, and give the male a chance to fertilize her himself. There is both supporting evidence for this theory and criticism against it.

Background  “[edit]” ???

In the early 1970s, a theory arose on the connection between stepparents and child maltreatment. “In 1973, forensic psychiatrist P. D. Scott summarized information on a sample of “fatal battered-baby cases” perpetrated in anger (…) 15 of the 29 killers – 52% – were stepfathers.”[1] Although initially there was no analysis of this raw data, empirical evidence has since been collected on what is now called the Cinderella effect through official records, reports, and census.

For over 30 years, data has been collected regarding the validity of the Cinderella effect, with a wealth of evidence indicating a direct relationship between step-relationships and abuse. This evidence of child abuse and homicide comes from a variety of sources including official reports of child abuse, clinical data, victim reports, and official homicide data.[2] Studies have concluded that “stepchildren in Canada, Great Britain, and the United States indeed incur greatly elevated risk of child maltreatment of various sorts, especially lethal beatings”.[3]

Powerful evidence in support of the Cinderella effect comes from the finding that when abusive parents have both step and genetic children, they generally spare their genetic children. In such families, stepchildren were exclusively targeted 9 out of 10 times in one study and in 19 of 22 in another.[4] In addition to displaying higher rates of negative behaviors (e.g., abuse) toward stepchildren, stepparents display fewer positive behaviors toward stepchildren than do the genetic parents. For example, on average, stepparents invest less in education, play with stepchildren less, take stepchildren to the doctor less, etc.[5] This discrimination against stepchildren is unusual compared with abuse statistics involving the overall population given “the following additional facts: (1) when child abuse is detected, it is often found that all the children in the home have been victimized; and (2) stepchildren are almost always the eldest children in the home, whereas the general (…) tendency in families of uniform parentage is for the youngest to be most frequent victims.”[3]

“Evolutionary” psychology theory”[edit]”

See also: Infanticide (“zoology”) and Kin selection

Evolutionary psychologists Martin Daly and Margo Wilson propose that the Cinderella effect is a direct consequence of the modern evolutionary theory of inclusive fitness, especially parental investment theory. They argue that human child rearing is so prolonged and costly that “a parental psychology shaped by natural selection is unlikely to be indiscriminate”.[6] According to them, “research concerning animal social behaviour provide a rationale for expecting parents to be discriminative in their care and affection, and more specifically, to discriminate in favour of their own young”.[7] Inclusive fitness theory proposes a selective criterion for the evolution of social traits, where social behavior that is costly to an individual organism can nevertheless emerge when there is a statistical likelihood that significant benefits of that social behavior accrue to (the survival and reproduction of) other organisms whom also carry the social trait (most straightforwardly, accrue to close genetic relatives). Under such conditions, a net overall increase in reproduction of the social trait in future generations can result.

The initial presentation of inclusive fitness theory (in the mid 1960s) focused on making the mathematical case for the possibility of social evolution, but also speculated about possible mechanisms whereby a social trait could effectively achieve this necessary statistical correlation between its likely bearers. Two possibilities were considered: One that a social trait might reliably operate straightforwardly via social context in species where genetic relatives are usually concentrated in a local home area where they were born (‘viscous populations’); The other, that genetic detection mechanisms (‘supergenes’) might emerge that go beyond statistical correlations, and reliably detect actual genetic relatedness between the social actors using direct ‘kin recognition’. The relative place of these two broad types of social mechanisms has been debated (see Kin selection and Kin recognition), but many biologists consider ‘kin recognition’ to be an important possible mechanism. Martin Daly and Margo Wilson follow this second mechanism, and expect that parents “discriminate in favour of their own young”, i.e. their actual genetic relatives.

Daly and Wilson research”[edit]”???

The most abundant data on stepchild mistreatment has been collected and interpreted by psychologists Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, who study with an emphasis in Neuroscience and Behavior at McMaster University. Their first measure of the validity of the Cinderella effect was based on data from the American Humane Association (AHA), an archive of child abuse reports in the United States holding over twenty thousand reports.[8] These records led Wilson and Daly to conclude that “a child under three years of age who lived with one genetic parent and one stepparent in the United States in 1976 was about seven times more likely to become a validated child-abuse case in the records than one who dwelt with two genetic parents”.[9] Their overall findings demonstrate that children residing with stepparents have a higher risk of abuse even when other factors are considered.[6]


All organisms face trade-offs as to how to invest their time, energy, risk, and other resources, so investment in one domain (e.g., parental investment) generally takes away from their ability to invest in other domains (e.g. mating effort, growth, or investment in other offspring).[10] Investment in non-genetic children therefore reduces an individual’s ability to invest in itself or its genetic children, without directly bringing reproductive benefits. Thus, from an evolutionary biology perspective, one would not expect organisms to regularly and deliberately care for unrelated offspring.

Daly and Wilson point out that infanticide is an extreme form of biasing parental investment that is widely practiced in the animal world.[11] For example, when an immigrant male lion enters a pride, it is not uncommon for him to kill the cubs fathered by other males.[12] Since the pride can only provide support for a limited number of cubs to survive to adulthood, the killing of the cubs in competition with the new male’s potential offspring increases the chances of his progeny surviving to maturity.[12] In addition, the act of infanticide speeds the return to sexual receptivity in the females, allowing for the male to father his own offspring in a timelier manner.[13] These observations indicate that in the animal world, males employ certain measures in order to ensure that parental investment is geared specifically toward their own offspring.[11]

Unlike the lion, however, humans in a stepparenting situation face a more complicated tradeoff since they cannot completely disown their partner’s offspring from a previous relationship, as they would risk losing sexual access to their partner and any chance of producing potential offspring. Thus, according to Daly and Wilson, stepparental investment can be viewed as mating effort to ensure the possibility of future reproduction with the parent of their stepchild.[14] This mating effort hypothesis suggests that humans will tend to invest more in their genetic offspring and invest just enough in their stepchildren. It is from this theoretical framework that Daly and Wilson argue that instances of child abuse towards non-biological offspring should be more frequent than towards biological offspring.[14]
One would therefore expect greater parental responsiveness towards one’s own offspring than towards unrelated children, and this will result in more positive outcomes and fewer negative outcomes towards one’s own children than towards other children in which one is expected to invest (i.e., stepchildren). “If child abuse is a behavioral response influenced by natural selection, then it is more likely to occur when there are reduced inclusive fitness payoffs owing to uncertain or low relatedness”.[15] Owing to these adaptations from natural selection, child abuse is more likely to be committed by stepparents than genetic parents—both are expected to invest heavily in the children, but genetic parents will have greater child-specific parental love that promotes positive caretaking and inhibits maltreatment.

Daly and Wilson report that this parental love can explain why genetic offspring are more immune to lashing out by parents.[16] They assert that, “Child-specific parental love is the emotional mechanism that permits people to tolerate—even to rejoice in—those long years of expensive, unreciprocated parental investment”.[16] They point to a study comparing natural father and stepfather families as support for the notion that stepparents do not view their stepchildren the same as their biological children, and likewise, children do not view their stepparents the same as their biological parents.[17][18] This study, based on a series of questionnaires which were then subjected to statistical analyses, reports that children are less likely to go to their stepfathers for guidance and that stepfathers rate their stepchildren less positively than do natural fathers.[18]

Daly and Wilson’s reports on the overrepresentation of stepparents in child homicide and abuse statistics support the evolutionary principle of maximizing one’s inclusive fitness, formalized under Hamilton’s Rule, which helps to explain why humans will preferentially invest in close kin.[6][19][20] Adoption statistics also substantiate this principle, in that non-kin adoptions represent a minority of worldwide adoptions.[11] Research into the high adoption rates of Oceania shows that childlessness is the most common reason for adopting, and that in the eleven populations for which data was available, a large majority of adoptions involved a relative with a coefficient of relatedness greater than or equal to 0.125 (e.g., genetic cousins).[21] It is also observed that parents with both biological and adopted children bias the partitioning of their estates in favor of the biological children, demonstrating again that parental behavior corresponds to the principles of kin selection.[21]


In their 1985 Canadian sample, Daly and Wilson classify the frequencies of different living arrangements (two natural parents, one natural parent, one natural parent with one stepparent, or other) according to child age. This was accomplished by administering a randomized telephone survey.[6]

Records of child abuse from children’s aid organizations as well as police reports on runaways and juvenile offenders were then used to determine whether children from stepparental living situations were overrepresented as abuse victims when compared to the demographic data gathered from the telephone survey data. The results indicate that the only living situation that has a significant correlation to increased child abuse is one natural parent and one stepparent in the same household. While rates of running away and crime were comparable for children living with stepparents and children of single-parents, abuse rates for children living with stepparents were much higher.[6]
Daly and Wilson examined several potentially confounding variables in their research, including socioeconomic status, family size, and maternal age at childbirth, however only minor differences between natural-parent and stepparent families with respect to these factors were found, indicating that none of these are major contributing factors to the observed Cinderella effect.[6]

Attachment theory”[edit]”

Further information: Attachment theory

Evolutionary psychologists have also suggested that one of the causes of stepchild abuse may be the lack of a parental attachment bond that the mother would normally form with her own child[citation needed]. An attachment bond will, in general, be more secure if formed before the age of two, and adoption can often disrupt the development of this bond. An infant who is fed by the primary parental figure, usually the mother, and has the mother present during severely physically painful events will have form a stronger parental attachment bond, and either a consistent omission of the mother from this process or an alteration between two people (the original mother and the adoptive mother) can cause either an insecure attachment or disorganized attachment from the parent to the child[citation needed]. As a result, it is highly recommended by most psychologists that the adoptive mother be present very early in the infant’s life, preferably immediately after its birth, in order to avoid attachment disruptions and attachment disorders.[22] This theory cannot be a whole explanation for the Cinderella effect, as psychological research has shown that secure attachment bonds can be developed between a parent and adopted child, and the quality of the relationship between parent and child will more often depend on the child’s pre-adoption experiences, such as length of time in social care and previous trauma, more than characteristics of the parents.[23]


It is sometimes argued that this evolutionary psychological account does not explain why the majority of stepparents do not abuse their partners’ children, or why a significant minority of genetic parents do abuse their own offspring. However, their argument is based on a misunderstanding: the evolutionary psychological account is that (all else equal) parents will love their own children more than other people’s children – it does not argue that stepparents will “want” to abuse their partner’s children, or that genetic parenthood is absolute proof against abuse. Under this account, stepparental care is seen as “mating effort” towards the genetic parent, such that most interactions between stepparent and stepchildren will be generally positive or at least neutral, just usually not as positive as interactions between the genetic parent and the child would be.[24]

Supportive “evidence”[edit]”???

Strong support for the Cinderella effect as described by Daly and Wilson comes from a study of unintentional childhood fatal injuries in Australia.[25] Tooley et al. follow the argument of Daly and Wilson to extend the Cinderella effect from cases of abuse to incidences of unintentional fatalities. Children are not only vulnerable to abuse by their parents, but they are also dependent on their parents for supervision and protection from a variety of other harms.[25][26] Given that parental supervision is fundamentally correlated to incidences of unintentional childhood injury as shown by Wadsworth et al. and Peterson & Stern, Tooley et al. posit that selective pressures would favor an inclination towards parental vigilance against threats to offspring well-being.[25][26][27] Tooley et al. further argue that parental vigilance is not as highly engaged in stepparents as genetic parents, therefore placing stepchildren at greater risk for unintentional injury.[25]

Based on data gathered from the Australia National Coroners’ Information System, stepchildren under five years of age are two to fifteen times more likely to experience an unintentional fatal injury, especially drowning, than genetic children.[25] Additionally, the study finds that the risks of unintentional fatal injury are not significantly higher for genetic children in single parent homes versus two-parent homes.[25] This difference suggests that removing one biological parent from the home does not significantly increase risk to the children, but that adding a nonbiological parent to the home results in a drastic increase in the risk of unintentional fatal injury.[25] Despite the fact that adding a stepparent to the home increases the available resources in terms of supervision in comparison to a single-parent home, risk of unintentional fatal injury still significantly rises.[25] This higher risk of injury for stepchildren can be attributed to the fact that stepparents occupy the same supervisory role as a genetic parent, yet they have a lower intrinsic commitment to protecting the child and therefore are less likely to be adequately vigilant.[25] The authors conclude that the Cinderella effect applies not only to purposeful abuse by stepparents, but is also relevant to explaining increased rates of accidental fatalities among stepchildren.[25]

Furthermore, a study of parental investment behaviors among American men living in Albuquerque, New Mexico, reveals a trend of increasing financial expenditures on genetic offspring in comparison to step-offspring, which also suggests that parents are less inclined to preserve the well-being of stepchildren.[28] The study assesses paternal investment based on four measures: the probability that a child attends college, the probability that the child receives money for college, the total money spent on children, and the amount of time per week spent with children.[28] Four different classifications of father-child relationships are examined and compared, including fathers living with their genetic children and stepfathers living with the stepchildren of their current mates.[28] Though the study finds a clear trend of increasing investment in genetic children, the data also shows that stepfathers do still invest substantially in stepchildren.[28] The authors explain the parental investment exhibited by stepfathers towards stepchildren as possibly motivated by the potential to improve the quality or increase the duration of the man’s relationship with the stepchildren’s mother.[28] This studied corroborates the findings of Lynn White, that stepparents in general provide less social support to stepchildren than their genetic children.[29]

Though the general trend of the data from this study supports the Cinderella effect, Anderson and colleagues note that the observed differences between investment in children and stepchildren might be slightly reduced by a few confounding factors.[28] For example, the authors point out that stepparenting is a self-selective process, and that when all else is equal, men who bond with unrelated children are more likely to become stepfathers, a factor that is likely to be a confounding variable in efforts to study the Cinderella effect.[28] Anderson and colleagues also conducted a similar study of Xhosa students in South Africa that analyzes the same four classifications of adult-child relationships, and this study offers similar results to those observed among men in Albuquerque.[30]

Additionally, a study of Hadza foragers in Tanzania by Marlowe also finds evidence of decreased care provided by men to stepchildren when compared with genetic children.[31] The author uses the Mann-Whitney U-tests to evaluate most of the observed differences in care exhibited towards children and stepchildren, and finds that Hadza men spend less time with (U=96), communicate less with (U=94.5), nurture less, and never play with their stepchildren.[31] Marlowe further argues that any care that is provided towards stepchildren is likely attributable to the man’s mating efforts and not parental interest in the well-being of the stepchildren.[31]

In further support of the Cinderella effect as elaborated by Daly and Wilson, a study conducted in a rural village in Trinidad demonstrates that in households containing both genetic children and stepchildren, fathers devote approximately twice as much time to interaction with genetic offspring in comparison to stepchildren.[32] Additionally, this study finds that the duration of the relationship between the stepfather and stepchildren is negatively correlated with the relative proportion of interaction time and positively correlated with the relative proportion of antagonistic interactions between the two.[32] As a proportion of total time spent interacting with genetic and stepchildren, stepfathers are shown to have approximately 75 percent more antagonistic interactions with stepchildren.[32] In this study, antagonistic interactions are defined as involving physical or verbal combat or an expression  of injury. This includes, for example, spanking, screaming, crying, and arguing. The duration of the relationship between genetic fathers and children shows a positive correlation with both relative proportion of interaction time and antagonistic interaction.[32] The author argues that these results show that in terms of time invested, men favor their children over stepchildren, and this preference is not attributable to the duration of the adult-child relationship, a factor which is sometimes believed to be a confounding variable in the Cinderella effect.[32] Though this study does claim a significant increase in antagonistic behavior between stepparents and stepchildren and therefore supports the Cinderella effect, it also notes that only six percent of all the observed parent-child interactions were considered antagonistic, and that the researchers never noticed any blatant physical child abuse.[32]


David Buller”[edit]”

Philosopher of science David Buller, as a part of his general critique of evolutionary psychology [33] has reviewed Daly and Wilson’s data. He argues that evolutionary psychology (EP) mistakenly attempts to discover human psychological adaptations rather than “the evolutionary causes of psychological traits.” Buller also argues that Daly and Wilson’s 1985 Canadian sample included cases of sexual abuse as well as cases of unintentional omission, such as not buckling a child’s seatbelt in the car. Buller asserts that unintentional omission does not fall under the realm of dangerous acts, and rather should be designated “maltreatment”. He argues that since sexual abuse is not often accompanied by physical abuse, it is unreasonable to assume that it is motivated by the same kind of psychological mechanism as child homicide. Buller also points out that the conclusion that non-biological parents are more likely to abuse children is contradicted by the fact that even if the rate of abuse among stepparents was disproportionate, most child abuse is in fact committed by biological parents, and that the lowest rate of child abuse is found among adoptive parents.[34] Daly and Wilson respond to Buller’s criticism by stating that Buller confuses the empirical statistical findings, which define the Cinderella effect, with the proposed theoretical framework, which offers an evolutionary explanation for the data.[35]
Buller also argues that Daly and Wilson’s findings are inherently biased since they use data from official documents, and the officials collecting that data are trained to take special notice of stepparents versus biological parents.[36] Furthermore, Buller states that since Daly and Wilson rely on official reports (such as death certificates) for their data, and that this data is inherently biased against stepparents.[36] He cites a Colorado study, in which it was found that maltreatment fatalities were more likely to be correctly reported on death certificates when an unrelated individual was the perpetrator rather than when a parent was the perpetrator, suggesting that the data is empirically skewed to support the Cinderella effect.[37] According to this study, by Crume et al., when the perpetrator of the murder was a parent, maltreatment was correctly noted on the death certificate only 46 percent of the time. Furthermore, they found that when the perpetrator was an “Other unrelated (including boyfriend)” individual, maltreatment was reported on the death certificate 86 percent of the time, significantly higher than for parents.[37] Although these statistics seem to provide evidence of bias against stepparents, further review of the data undermines this conclusion. As Crume et al. and Daly and Wilson note, maltreatment was only likely to be reported on the death certificates 47 percent of the time in the case of “Other relatives (including step-parents),” which represents a marginal increase from the amount of parental maltreatment.[35][37] Therefore, as Daly and Wilson respond to Buller’s critique, this does not seem to be a significant source of error in studying the Cinderella effect and does not provide evidence for inherent bias in their data.[35]

Temrin et al. Sweden study[edit]

The findings of Daly and Wilson have been called into question by one study of child homicides in Sweden between 1975 and 1995, which found that children living in households with a non-genetic parent were not at an increased risk of homicide when compared to children living with both genetic parents. The study, published in 2000 and conducted by Temrin and colleagues argued that when Daly and Wilson classified homicides according to family situation, they did not account for the genetic relatedness of the parent who actually committed the crime. In the Swedish sample, in two out of the seven homicides with a genetic and non-genetic parent, the offender was actually the genetic parent and thus these homicides do not support Daly and Wilson’s definition of the Cinderella effect.[38]
Daly and Wilson attribute the contrasting findings of the Swedish study to an analytical oversight. Temrin and colleagues neglect to consider the fact that the proportion of children in living situations with a stepparent is not constant for all child age groups, but rather increases with age. After correcting for age differences, the Swedish data set produces results in accordance with the previous findings of Daly and Wilson. The Swedish sample does show, however, decreased risk to children living with a stepparent compared to the North American samples collected by Daly and Wilson, suggesting that there is some degree of cross-cultural variation in the Cinderella effect.[3]

Alternative hypotheses”[edit]”???
It has been noted by multiple researchers that child abuse is an intricate issue and is affected by other factors.[15][38][39] Daly and Wilson state, however, that even if evolutionary psychology cannot account for every instance of stepparental abuse, this does not invalidate their empirical findings.[35]

Burgess and Drais propose that child maltreatment is too complex to be explained fully by genetic relatedness alone and cite other reasons for child maltreatment, such as social factors, ecological factors and child traits such as disability and age.[15] However, they also note that these traits are simply indicative, and do not inevitably lead to child maltreatment.[15] Temrin and colleagues also suggest that there may be other factors involved with child homicide, such as prior convictions, drug abuse problems, lost custody battles and mental health problems.[38]
In 1984, Giles-Sims and David Finkelhor categorized and evaluated five possible hypotheses that could explain the Cinderella effect: “social-evolutionary theory”, “normative theory”, “stress theory”, “selection factors”, and “resource theory”. The social-evolutionary theory is based on the proposal that non-genetically related parents will invest less in costly parental duties, due to the fact that their genes are not being passed on by that individual. The normative theory proposes that, due to genetic repercussions, incest among genetically related individuals is a widespread taboo and would thus be less common among biological relatives. They propose that incest among stepfamilies would be less taboo, since there is no risk of genetic degradation. The stress theory proposes that increased stressors, which are inherently more common among stepfamilies, cause an increased risk of abuse. The selection factors theory proposes that individuals who are likely to be stepparents (divorcees) are likely to be inherently more violent due to emotional disturbances, aggressive impulses, and self-esteem issues. Due to this, stepparents as a group would have a higher proportion of individuals with violent-prone characteristics, which would suggest that the abuse is happening due to personality factors, rather than the stepparental relationship directly. Finally, according to resource theory, individuals who contribute resources are granted authority, while individuals that lack resources are denied authority and more likely to resort to violence to obtain authority. It is therefore hypothesized that stepparents who are able to contribute resources to a family and have those resources be accepted by the family are less likely to be abusive.

However, this hypothesis had yet to be tested directly on stepfamilies.[39] This paper of Giles-Sims and Finkelhor predates however practically all empirical studies on the Cinderella effect.  Ethical issues[edit]
Discussing the implications of this line of research, Australian psychologist Greg Tooley, author of a 2006 study confirming the existence of the effect,[25] confessed that “it is certainly difficult to talk about because it is such a
hot”     issue“.[40]

Angel Post CPS Hearing Statement, and God Bless the Memory of Lil’ Angel, Buddy Cook

Angel Cook’s Little Angel, Now Deceased, Buddy Cook– CPS in Texas, and Judge Specia (head of DFPS)/Office of Consumer Affairs, knew he had HIV/AIDS and covered it up

Elonis v. United States: What is NOT a “Threat”

Elonis v. United States, No. 13-983, 575 U.S. ___ (June 1, 2015).

June 5, 2015 | Volume 42 Issue 22 | Filed Under: Criminal | Tagged: C. Thomas, J. Roberts, S. Alito,SCOTUS
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.]

Federal law makes it a crime to transmit in interstate commerce “any communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another.” 18 U.S. C. §875(c). Petitioner was convicted of violating this provision under instructions that required the jury to find that he communicated what a reasonable person would regard as a threat. The question is whether the statute also requires that the defendant be aware of the threatening nature of the communication, and—if not—whether the First Amendment requires such a showing.

Anthony Douglas Elonis was an active user of the social networking Web site Facebook.… In May 2010, Elonis’s wife of nearly seven years left him, taking with her their two young children. Elonis began “listening to more violent music” and posting self-styled “rap” lyrics inspired by the music. … The lyrics Elonis posted [on Facebook] … included graphically violent language and imagery. This material was often interspersed with disclaimers that the lyrics were “fictitious,” with no intentional “resemblance to real persons.” [App.] 331, 329. Elonis posted an explanation to another Facebook user that “I’m doing this for me. My writing is therapeutic.” Id., at 329; see also id., at 205 (testifying that it “helps me to deal with the pain”).
Elonis’s co-workers and friends viewed the posts in a different light.…

A grand jury indicted Elonis for making threats to injure patrons and employees [at his former place of employment], his estranged wife, police officers, a kindergarten class, and an FBI agent, all in violation of 18 U.S. C. §875(c). … In the District Court, Elonis moved to dismiss the indictment for failing to allege that he had intended to threaten anyone. The District Court denied the motion, holding that Third Circuit precedent required only that Elonis “intentionally made the communication, not that he intended to make a threat.” … At trial, Elonis testified that his posts emulated the rap lyrics of the well-known performer Eminem, some of which involve fantasies about killing his ex-wife. … In Elonis’s view, he had posted “nothing . . . that hasn’t been said already.” … The Government presented as witnesses Elonis’s wife and co-workers, all of whom said they felt afraid and viewed Elonis’s posts as serious threats. …
Elonis requested a jury instruction that “the government must prove that he intended to communicate a true threat.” Id., at 21. See also id., at 267–269, 303. The District Court denied that request. The jury instructions instead informed the jury that
“A statement is a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes a statement in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual.” Id., at 301.
The Government’s closing argument emphasized that it was irrelevant whether Elonis intended the postings to be threats—“it doesn’t matter what he thinks.” Id., at 286. A jury convicted Elonis on four of the five counts against him….
Elonis renewed his challenge to the jury instructions in the Court of Appeals, contending that the jury should have been required to find that he intended his posts to be threats. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the intent required by Section 875(c) is only the intent to communicate words that the defendant understands, and that a reasonable person would view as a threat. 730 F. 3d 321, 332 (CA3 2013).
We granted certiorari. 573 U.S. ___ (2014).
An individual who “transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another” is guilty of a felony and faces up to five years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S. C. §875(c). This statute requires that a communication be transmitted and that the communication contain a threat. It does not specify that the defendant must have any mental state with respect to these elements. In particular, it does not indicate whether the defendant must intend that his communication contain a threat.
The fact that the statute does not specify any required mental state, however, does not mean that none exists. We have repeatedly held that “mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal intent” should not be read “as dispensing with it.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). This rule of construction reflects the basic principle that “wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.”Id., at 252. … Although there are exceptions, the “general rule” is that a guilty mind is “a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime.” United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922). We therefore generally “interpret[] criminal statutes to include broadly applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its terms does not contain them.” United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994).
When interpreting federal criminal statutes that are silent on the required mental state, we read into the statute “only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’” Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) (quoting X-Citement Video, 513 U.S., at 72). In some cases, a general requirement that a defendant act knowingly is itself an adequate safeguard. … In other instances, however, requiring only that the defendant act knowingly “would fail to protect the innocent actor.”   …


Section 875(c), as noted, requires proof that a communication was transmitted and that it contained a threat. The “presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” X-Citement Video, 513 U.S., at 72 (emphasis added). The parties agree that a defendant under Section 875(c) must know that he is transmitting a communication. But communicating something is not what makes the conduct “wrongful.” Here “the crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct” is the threatening nature of the communication. Id., at 73. The mental state requirement must therefore apply to the fact that the communication contains a threat.

Elonis’s conviction, however, was premised solely on how his posts would be understood by a reasonable person. Such a “reasonable person” standard is a familiar feature of civil liability in tort law, but is inconsistent with “the conventional requirement for criminal conduct— awareness of some wrongdoing.”Staples [v. United States], 511 U.S. [600,] 606–607 [(1994)] (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943); emphasis added). Having liability turn on whether a “reasonable person” regards the communication as a threat—regardless of what the defendant thinks— “reduces culpability on the all-important element of the crime to negligence,” Jeffries, 692 F. 3d, at 484 (Sutton, J., dubitante), and we “have long been reluctant to infer that a negligence standard was intended in criminal statutes,” Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing Morissette, 342 U.S. 246). See 1 C. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law §27, pp. 171–172 (15th ed. 1993); Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 294 (1895) (defendant could face “liability in a civil action for negligence, but he could only be held criminally for an evil intent actually existing in his mind”). Under these principles, “what [Elonis] thinks” does matter. App. 286.
*     *     *
In light of the foregoing, Elonis’s conviction cannot stand. The jury was instructed that the Government need prove only that a reasonable person would regard Elonis’s communications as threats, and that was error. Federal criminal liability generally does not turn solely on the results of an act without considering the defendant’s mental state. That understanding “took deep and early root in American soil” and Congress left it intact here: Under Section 875(c), “wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.” Morissette, 342 U.S., at 252.
There is no dispute that the mental state requirement in Section 875(c) is satisfied if the defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat. … In response to a question at oral argument, Elonis stated that a finding of recklessness would not be sufficient. … Neither Elonis nor the Government has briefed or argued that point, and we accordingly decline to address it. See Department of Treasury, IRS v. FLRA, 494 U.S. 922, 933 (1990) (this Court is “poorly situated” to address an argument the Court of Appeals did not consider, the parties did not brief, and counsel addressed in “only the most cursory fashion at oral argument”). Given our disposition, it is not necessary to consider any First Amendment issues.

Both Justice Alito and Justice Thomas complain about our not deciding whether recklessness suffices for liability under Section 875(c). … Justice Alito contends that each party “argued” this issue, post, at 2, but they did not address it at all until oral argument, and even then only briefly. …

Justice Alito also suggests that we have not clarified confusion in the lower courts. That is wrong. Our holding makes clear that negligence is not sufficient to support a conviction under Section 875(c), contrary to the view of nine Courts of Appeals. Pet. for Cert. 17. There was and is no circuit conflict over the question Justice Alito and Justice Thomas would have us decide—whether recklessness suffices for liability under Section 875(c). No Court of Appeals has even addressed that question. We think that is more than sufficient “justification,” … for us to decline to be the first appellate tribunal to do so.


The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Alito, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803), the Court famously proclaimed: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Today, the Court announces: It is emphatically the prerogative of this Court to say only what the law is not.
The Court’s disposition of this case is certain to cause confusion and serious problems. Attorneys and judges need to know which mental state is required for conviction under 18 U.S. C. §875(c), an important criminal statute. This case squarely presents that issue, but the Court provides only a partial answer. The Court holds that the jury instructions in this case were defective because they required only negligence in conveying a threat. But the Court refuses to explain what type of intent was necessary. Did the jury need to find that Elonis had the purpose of conveying a true threat? Was it enough if he knew that his words conveyed such a threat? Would recklessness suffice? The Court declines to say. Attorneys and judges are left to guess.




… In my view, the term “threat” in §875(c) can fairly be defined as a statement that is reasonably interpreted as “an expression of an intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage on another.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2382 (1976). Conviction under §875(c) demands proof that the defendant’s transmission was in fact a threat, i.e., that it is reasonable to interpret the transmission as an expression of an intent to harm another. In addition, it must be shown that the defendant was at least reckless as to whether the transmission met that requirement.

Why is recklessness enough? My analysis of the mens rea issue follows the same track as the Court’s, as far as it goes. I agree with the Court that we should presume that criminal statutes require some sort ofmens rea for conviction. See ante, at 9–13. To be sure, this presumption marks a departure from the way in which we generally interpret statutes. We “ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.” Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997). But this step is justified by a well-established pattern in our criminal laws. “For several centuries (at least since 1600) the different common law crimes have been so defined as to require, for guilt, that the defendant’s acts or omissions be accompanied by one or more of the various types of fault (intention, knowledge, recklessness or—more rarely— negligence).” 1 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §5.5, p. 381 (2003). Based on these “background rules of the common law, in which the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded,” we require “some indication of congressional intent, express or implied, . . . to dispense withmens rea as an element of a crime.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605–606 (1994).

For a similar reason, I agree with the Court that we should presume that an offense like that created by §875(c) requires more than negligence with respect to a critical element like the one at issue here. …

Once we have passed negligence, however, no further presumptions are defensible. In the hierarchy of mental states that may be required as a condition for criminal liability, the mens rea just above negligence is recklessness. Negligence requires only that the defendant “should [have] be[en] aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk,” ALI, Model Penal Code §2.02(2)(d), p. 226 (1985), while recklessness exists “when a person disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Model Penal Code §2.02(2)(c). And when Congress does not specify a mens rea in a criminal statute, we have no justification for inferring that anything more than recklessness is needed. It is quite unusual for us to interpret a statute to contain a requirement that is nowhere set out in the text. Once we have reached recklessness, we have gone as far as we can without stepping over the line that separates interpretation from amendment.

There can be no real dispute that recklessness regarding a risk of serious harm is wrongful conduct. In a wide variety of contexts, we have described reckless conduct as morally culpable. See, e.g., Farmer, supra, at 835–836 (deliberate indifference to an inmate’s harm); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (criminal libel); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–280 (1964) (civil libel). Indeed, this Court has held that “reckless disregard for human life” may justify the death penalty. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987). Someone who acts recklessly with respect to conveying a threat necessarily grasps that he is not engaged in innocent conduct. He is not merely careless. He is aware that others could regard his statements as a threat, but he delivers them anyway.
Accordingly, I would hold that a defendant may be convicted under §875(c) if he or she consciously disregards the risk that the communication transmitted will be interpreted as a true threat. Nothing in the Court’s noncommittal opinion prevents lower courts from adopting that standard.


There remains the question whether interpreting §875(c) to require no more than recklessness with respect to the element at issue here would violate the First Amendment. Elonis contends that it would. I would reject that argument.

It is settled that the Constitution does not protect true threats. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–360 (2003); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992); Watts [v. United States], 394 U.S. [705,] 707–708 [(1969) (per curiam)]. And there are good reasons for that rule: True threats inflict great harm and have little if any social value. A threat may cause serious emotional stress for the person threatened and those who care about that person, and a threat may lead to a violent confrontation. It is true that a communication containing a threat may include other statements that have value and are entitled to protection. But that does not justify constitutional protection for the threat itself.
It can be argued that §875(c), if not limited to threats made with the intent to harm, will chill statements that do not qualify as true threats, e.g., statements that may be literally threatening but are plainly not meant to be taken seriously. We have sometimes cautioned that it is necessary to “exten[d] a measure of strategic protection” to otherwise unprotected false statements of fact in order to ensure enough “‘breathing space’” for protected speech. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). A similar argument might be made with respect to threats. But we have also held that the law provides adequate breathing space when it requires proof that false statements were made with reckless disregard of their falsity. See New York Times, 376 U.S., at 279–280 (civil liability);Garrison, 379 U.S., at 74–75 (criminal liability). Requiring proof of recklessness is similarly sufficient here.


Finally, because the jury instructions in this case did not require proof of recklessness, I would vacate the judgment below and remand for the Court of Appeals to decide in the first instance whether Elonis’s conviction could be upheld under a recklessness standard.


Justice Thomas, dissenting.

We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the lower courts over the appropriate mental state for threat prosecutions under 18 U.S. C. §875(c). Save two, every Circuit to have considered the issue—11 in total—has held that this provision demands proof only of general intent, which here requires no more than that a defendant knew he transmitted a communication, knew the words used in that communication, and understood the ordinary meaning of those words in the relevant context. The outliers are the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, which have concluded that proof of an intent to threaten was necessary for conviction. Adopting the minority position, Elonis urges us to hold that §875(c) and the First Amendment require proof of an intent to threaten. The Government in turn advocates a general-intent approach.

Rather than resolve the conflict, the Court casts aside the approach used in nine Circuits and leaves nothing in its place. Lower courts are thus left to guess at the appropriate mental state for §875(c). All they know after today’s decision is that a requirement of general intent will not do. But they can safely infer that a majority of this Court would not adopt an intent-to-threaten requirement, as the opinion carefully leaves open the possibility that recklessness may be enough. See ante, at 16–17.

This failure to decide throws everyone from appellate judges to everyday Facebook users into a state of uncertainty. This uncertainty could have been avoided had we simply adhered to the background rule of the common law favoring general intent. Although I am sympathetic to my colleagues’ policy concerns about the risks associated with threat prosecutions, the answer to such fears is not to discard our traditional approach to state-of-mind requirements in criminal law. Because the Court of Appeals properly applied the general-intent standard, and because the communications transmitted by Elonis were “true threats” unprotected by the First Amendment, I would affirm the judgment below.
Our default rule in favor of general intent applies with full force to criminal statutes addressing speech. Well over 100 years ago, this Court considered a conviction under a federal obscenity statute that punished anyone “‘who shall knowingly deposit, or cause to be deposited, for mailing or delivery,’” any “‘obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, paper, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character.’” Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 30 (1896) (quoting Rev. Stat. §3893). In that case, as here, the defendant argued that, even if “he may have had . . . actual knowledge or notice of [the paper’s] contents” when he put it in the mail, he could not “be convicted of the offence . . . unless he knew or believed that such paper could be properly or justly characterized as obscene, lewd, and lascivious.” 161 U.S., at 41. The Court rejected that theory, concluding that if the material was actually obscene and “deposited in the mail by one who knew or had notice at the time of its contents, the offence is complete, although the defendant himself did not regard the paper as one that the statute forbade to be carried in the mails.” Ibid. As the Court explained, “Congress did not intend that the question as to the character of the paper should depend upon the opinion or belief of the person who, with knowledge or notice of [the paper’s] contents, assumed the responsibility of putting it in the mails of the United States,” because “[e]very one who uses the mails of the United States for carrying papers or publications must take notice of . . . what must be deemed obscene, lewd, and lascivious.” Id., at 41–42.



Applying ordinary rules of statutory construction, I would read §875(c) to require proof of general intent. To “know the facts that make his conduct illegal” under §875(c), see Staples, 511 U.S., at 605, a defendant must know that he transmitted a communication in interstate or foreign commerce that contained a threat. Knowing that the communication contains a “threat”—a serious expression of an intention to engage in unlawful physical violence—does not, however, require knowing that a jury will conclude that the communication contains a threat as a matter of law. Instead, like one who mails an “obscene” publication and is prosecuted under the federal obscenity statute, a defendant prosecuted under §875(c) must know only the words used in that communication, along with their ordinary meaning in context.



The majority refuses to apply these ordinary background principles. Instead, it casts my application of general intent as a negligence standard disfavored in the criminal law. Ante, at 13–16. But that characterization misses the mark. Requiring general intent in this context is not the same as requiring mere negligence. Like the mental-state requirements adopted in many of the cases cited by the Court, general intent under §875(c) prevents a defendant from being convicted on the basis of any fact beyond his awareness. See, e.g., United States v. XCitement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994) (knowledge of age of persons depicted in explicit materials); Staples, supra, at 614–615 (knowledge of firing capability of weapon); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 270– 271 (1952) (knowledge that property belonged to another). In other words, the defendant must know—not merely be reckless or negligent with respect to the fact—that he is committing the acts that constitute the actus reus of the offense.
But general intent requires no mental state (not even a negligent one) concerning the “fact” that certain words meet the legal definition of a threat. That approach is particularly appropriate where, as here, that legal status is determined by a jury’s application of the legal standard of a “threat” to the contents of a communication. And convicting a defendant despite his ignorance of the legal— or objective—status of his conduct does not mean that he is being punished for negligent conduct. …

In light of my conclusion that Elonis was properly convicted under the requirements of §875(c), I must address his argument that his threatening posts were nevertheless protected by the First Amendment.


Elonis does not contend that threats are constitutionally protected speech, nor could he: “From 1791 to the present, . . . our society . . . has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,” true threats being one of them. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382– 383 (1992); see id., at 388. Instead, Elonis claims that only intentional threats fall within this particular historical exception.

If it were clear that intentional threats alone have been punished in our Nation since 1791, I would be inclined to agree. But that is the not the case. Although the Federal Government apparently did not get into the business of regulating threats until 1917, the States have been doing so since the late 18th and early 19th centuries. [Citations omitted.] And that practice continued even after the States amended their constitutions to include speech protections similar to those in the First Amendment. [Citations omitted.] State practice thus provides at least some evidence of the original meaning of the phrase “freedom of speech” in the First Amendment. [Citation omitted.]
… In short, there is good reason to believe that States bound by their own Constitutions to protect freedom of speech long ago enacted general-intent threat statutes.
Elonis also insists that our precedents require a mental state of intent when it comes to threat prosecutions under §875(c), primarily relying on Watts, 394 U.S. 705, and Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). Neither of those decisions, however, addresses whether the First Amendment requires a particular mental state for threat prosecutions.

As Elonis admits, Watts expressly declined to address the mental state required under the First Amendment for a “true threat.” See 394 U.S., at 707–708. True, the Court in Watts noted “grave doubts” about Raganksy [v. United States, 253 F. 643 (7th Cir. 1918)]’s construction of “willfully” in the presidential threats statute. 394 U.S., at 707–708. But “grave doubts” do not make a holding, and that stray statement in Watts is entitled to no precedential force. If anything, Watts continued the long tradition of focusing on objective criteria in evaluating the mental requirement. See ibid.


In addition to requiring a departure from our precedents, adopting Elonis’ view would make threats one of the most protected categories of unprotected speech, thereby sowing tension throughout our First Amendment doctrine. We generally have not required a heightened mental state under the First Amendment for historically unprotected categories of speech. For instance, the Court has indicated that a legislature may constitutionally prohibit “‘fighting words,’ those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction,” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)—without proof of an intent to provoke a violent reaction. Because the definition of “fighting words” turns on how the “ordinary citizen” would react to the language, ibid., this Court has observed that a defendant may be guilty of a breach of the peace if he “makes statements likely to provoke violence and disturbance of good order, even though no such eventuality be intended,” and that the punishment of such statements “as a criminal act would raise no question under [the Constitution],” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–310 (1940); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572– 573 (1942) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a general-intent construction of a state statute punishing “‘fighting’ words”); State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N. H. 310, 318, 18 A. 2d 754, 758 (1941) (“[T]he only intent required for conviction . . . was an intent to speak the words”). The Court has similarly held that a defendant may be convicted of mailing obscenity under the First Amendment without proof that he knew the materials were legally obscene. Hamling [v. United States], 418 U.S. [87,] 120–124 [(1974)]. And our precedents allow liability in tort for false statements about private persons on matters of private concern even if the speaker acted negligently with respect to the falsity of those statements. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 770, 773–775 (1986). I see no reason why we should give threats pride of place among unprotected speech.
words, the defendant must know—not merely be reckless or negligent with respect to the fact—that he is committing the acts that constitute the actus reus of the offense.

But general intent requires no mental state (not even a negligent one) concerning the “fact” that certain words meet the legal definition of a threat. That approach is particularly appropriate where, as here, that legal status is determined by a jury’s application of the legal standard of a “threat” to the contents of a communication. And convicting a defendant despite his ignorance of the legal— or objective—status of his conduct does not mean that he is being punished for negligent conduct. …


In light of my conclusion that Elonis was properly convicted under the requirements of §875(c), I must address his argument that his threatening posts were nevertheless protected by the First Amendment.


Elonis does not contend that threats are constitutionally protected speech, nor could he: “From 1791 to the present, . . . our society . . . has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,” true threats being one of them. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382– 383 (1992); see id., at 388. Instead, Elonis claims that only intentional threats fall within this particular historical exception.

If it were clear that intentional threats alone have been punished in our Nation since 1791, I would be inclined to agree. But that is the not the case. Although the Federal Government apparently did not get into the business of regulating threats until 1917, the States have been doing so since the late 18th and early 19th centuries. [Citations omitted.] And that practice continued even after the States amended their constitutions to include speech protections similar to those in the First Amendment. [Citations omitted.] State practice thus provides at least some evidence of the original meaning of the phrase “freedom of speech” in the First Amendment.
I respectfully dissent.ent
Read Full Opinion
Opinion (John G. Roberts, Jr.)
Concurrence (Samuel A. Alito, Jr.)
Dissent (Clarence Thomas)
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .


elonis v. united states
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit
No. 13–983. Argued December 1, 2014—Decided June 1, 2015


After his wife left him, petitioner Anthony Douglas Elonis, under the pseudonym “Tone Dougie,” used the social networking Web site Facebook to post self-styled rap lyrics containing graphically violent language and imagery concerning his wife, co-workers, a kindergarten class, and state and federal law enforcement. These posts were often interspersed with disclaimers that the lyrics were “fictitious” and not intended to depict real persons, and with statements that Elonis was exercising his First Amendment rights. Many who knew him saw his posts as threatening, however, including his boss, who fired him for threatening co-workers, and his wife, who sought and was granted a state court protection-from-abuse order against him.

When Elonis’s former employer informed the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the posts, the agency began monitoring Elonis’s Face-book activity and eventually arrested him. He was charged with five counts of violating 18 U. S. C. §875(c), which makes it a federal crime to transmit in interstate commerce “any communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another.” At trial, Elonis requested a jury instruction that the Government was required to prove that he intended to communicate a “true threat.” Instead, the District Court told the jury that Elonis could be found guilty if a reasonable person would foresee that his statements would be interpreted as a threat. Elonis was convicted on four of the five counts and renewed his jury instruction challenge on appeal. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that Section 875(c) requires only the intent to communicate words that the defendant understands, and that a reasonable person would view as a threat.

Held: The Third Circuit’s instruction, requiring only negligence with respect to the communication of a threat, is not sufficient to support a conviction under Section 875(c). Pp. 7–17.

(a) Section 875(c) does not indicate whether the defendant must intend that the communication contain a threat, and the parties can show no indication of a particular mental state requirement in the statute’s text. Elonis claims that the word “threat,” by definition, conveys the intent to inflict harm. But common definitions of “threat” speak to what the statement conveys—not to the author’s mental state. The Government argues that the express “intent to extort” requirements in neighboring Sections 875(b) and (d) should preclude courts from implying an unexpressed “intent to threaten” requirement in Section 875(c). The most that can be concluded from such a comparison, however, is that Congress did not mean to confine Section 875(c) to crimes of extortion, not that it meant to exclude a mental state requirement. Pp. 7–9.
(b) The Court does not regard “mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal intent” as dispensing with such a requirement. Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246 . This rule of construction reflects the basic principle that “wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal,” and that a defendant must be “blameworthy in mind” before he can be found guilty. Id., at 252. The “general rule” is that a guilty mind is “a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime.” United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250 . Thus, criminal statutes are generally interpreted “to include broadly applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute . . . does not contain them.” United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64 . This does not mean that a defendant must know that his conduct is illegal, but a defendant must have knowledge of “the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense.” Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600 , n. 3. Federal criminal statutes that are silent on the required mental state should be read to include “only that mens reawhich is necessary to separate” wrongful from innocent conduct. Carter v. United States, 530 U. S. 255 . In some cases, a general requirement that a defendant act knowingly is sufficient, but where such a requirement “would fail to protect the innocent actor,” the statute “would need to be read to require . . . specific intent.” Ibid. Pp. 9–13.

(c) The “presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” X-Citement Video, 513 U. S., at 72. In the context of Section 875(c), that requires proof that a communication was transmitted and that it contained a threat. And because “the crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct,” id., at 73, is the threatening nature of the communication, the mental state requirement must apply to the fact that the communication contains a threat. Elonis’s conviction was premised solely on how his posts would be viewed by a reasonable person, a standard feature of civil liability in tort law inconsistent with the conventional criminal conduct requirement of “awareness of some wrongdoing,” Staples, 511 U. S., at 606–607. This Court “ha[s] long been reluctant to infer that a negligence standard was intended in criminal statutes.” Rogers v. United States, 422 U. S. 35 (Marshall, J., concurring). And the Government fails to show that the instructions in this case required more than a mental state of negligence. Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87 , distinguished. Section 875(c)’s mental state requirement is satisfied if the defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat. The Court declines to address whether a mental state of recklessness would also suffice. Given the disposition here, it is unnecessary to consider any First Amendment issues. Pp. 13–17.
730 F. 3d. 321, reversed and remanded.

Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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Kimberly A. Abernethy, a private play therapist in Houston, Texas who “coached” my son for the father, Matthew James Worrell/a.k.a. “Matt James Worrell,” to allege sexual abuse AGAINST “Daddy and ‘The Visitor,'” a ” runaway teenager with ‘black, spiky hair.” (the reveal of my son began when we prayed for the missing children on the flyer we received in a routine mailer). 
I was so naïve to believe my then five year-old son, and especially when there was No court case of which I was yet aware.
Little did I know “Miss Kim” is licensed by Department of Family and Protective Services for state of Texas (“DFPS”).

My son and only “child,” Julian Jacob “Worrell” of family Saloom,  is now ten years old, in the summer before fifth grade, and, although I have not “lost parental rights,” all contact has been thwarted for over five years with the exception of a handful of “SAFE” supervised ‘visitation’ since the week of Mother’s Day in May 2012.  It is now June of 2017, and I am dying of injustice, or, rather, “justice.”

Julian’s Real Mummy, Joni Faith Saloom, wishes to inform the Public Good that there is a lot of media spinning that serves the purposes of high-ranking bitter and militant Father’s for Equal Rights, some of whom are confirmed pedophiles, on knowledge, evidence, and belief who have and will continue to be exposed.  This is not supposed to be a gender war, but they would make it one.  Unfortunately, many of them have been given high-ranking positions in federal and state governments (Cross reference the research of Ms. Elizabeth/”Liz” Richards and Cindy Ross of the National Alliance for Family Court Justice at


On the other side of the proverbial coin, there are battle-scarred and wounded fathers I speak to daily who are reciprocally a source of comfort to myself who I feel a need to support and together we SHALL STAND to if not change, to at least expose and fight to the righteous death to protect our children from monetized assets for all current systems of government and joint public-private venture privateers and capitalists alike.  It has been written that a child mis-educated is a child lost (Profiles in Courage, John Fitzgerald Kennedy.)  If fatherless homes be devastating, then imagine how horrendous life will be without the love of a mother.  Yet, court-appointed evaluators, “therapists,” guardian ad litem, amicus attorneys, court-appointed attorneys for children or natural real property, child “protective services,” and “parental evaluators” and Child Advocacy Centers and other court criminal enterprises such as “SAFE,” Kids First, and New Day and these play therapists who are licensed and, thus, monitored only by themselves being licensed through Department of Family and Protective Services for the state of Texas (DFPS, CPS division) in Austin, Texas.

This is how I lost my only child, to a play therapist named Kimberly A. Abernethy in North Houston, Texas (Harris County).  At the desire of Mr. Worrell and family, Julian’s father, the grandmother who tried to kidnap him with the father after having no contact or desire to be a part of his life or having shown up for the birth and after trying to coerce mother into abortion with terroristic threats in 2006 (evidence in possession), six years later Mr. Worrell got married, undoubtedly taking advantage of “Responsible Fatherhood” and “Marriage Promotion” grants payable to the states and local government and district court judges like Lisa Millard and Associate Judge Conrad Moren, and, along with Play Therapist Kim Abernethy, coached Julian to convince “Mommy” that “Daddy” and “The Visitor”–a “homeless, runaway teenager with black, spiky hair who always spent the night at Daddy and Nancy’s house  in Tomball, Texas (Harris County, Pct. 4 under Constable Ron Hickman and Captain Paul Staton who refused to provide police report of sexual abuse in mother’s and child’s “defense(?)”where “J.W.” now resides and calls he/r “Mommy” and three other small children from Ms. Gray-Worrell’s previous marriage to a one Mr. Darin Paul Dufour in their then marital home who, court records will show and firsthand testimony in court revealed through Nancy that they were both adulterers), sexually abused my baby boy.

They did not act alone.  Involved were also notoriously and actually retaliatory Brazoria County CPS Supervisor Cheryl Harvick, caseworker Lesly Damian-Murray, Dedra Latasha Hardaway, Director Karen Coblentz, Officer Paul Elton of The Pearland Police Department (who said of course of the father was guilty directly to author of this post on May 08, 2012 at the Pearland CPS Office),  former Sergeant  William Lilly, appointed to Special Investigations by Harris County Sheriff Adrian Garcia for Sex Crimes Against Children under the non-supervision of Ruben Diaz, guardian ad litem/attorney ad litem for Julian who refused to even speak to, let alone “interview,” mother Joni, an individual with significant knowledge of the child’s life in contravention of Texas Family Code statutory duty absent artful semantics), the pernicious Donna Everson, CPS Prosecutor William Sumpter Frazier under Harris County Attorney Vince Ryan for Judge Ed Emmett of the Commissioner’s Court, Julia Lovorn (in 2007), Texas Superlawyer John Nichols, Sr. and “Bo” Nichols, Jr., The Office of the Texas Attorney General, Child Support Division staff on Highway 6, Houston Attorney Bruce Allen Buskirk, Houston Attorney Lawrence/”Larry” Rothenberg,  Associate Judge Conrad Moren, and elected Judge Lisa Millard of the 310th court in Harris County, Texas (the same judge who sentenced Mr. Clifford Hall to jail for his company having overpaid child support on accident, a clerical error).  Mr. Hall’s ex-wife used the same play therapist for their child, but not for sexual abuse allegations (direct, firsthand testimony from Mr. Hall to the author of this blog and post, Julian’s Real Mummy.”

As a direct result of this honest services fraud, conspiracy against constitutional and natural, God-given and common law rights to permanently and with knowledge, intent, and forseeability deprive a five and one half-year old mother and son who could not have been more (appropriately) loving or healthy, the author of this post and blog has not seen Julian Jacob Worrell of Genealogy Saloom, Joni’s  life’s blood, he/r soul, he/r heart, in over two and one half years.  Ms. Abernethy and Mr. Worrell,” aided by poor, yet seven years worth of legal advice that came to fruition and paid out for Mr. Worrell on May 08, 2012 at the Pearland CPS office  in Brazoria County when Julian was abducted under the color of the “authority” of law for the state of Texas when multiple police officers and Cheryl Harvick wrongfully, unconstitutionally, thus, unlawfully and illegally (See Supremacy Clause of  The Constitution for the united States of America (1776) and its Bill of Rights via ratification and application of the Fourteenth Amendment and also The Declaration of Independence, a Founding document and its guaranteed, “unalienable” rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”).

Julian’s eighth (8th) birthday was yesterday, and nobody, for the third consecutive birthday without his Real Mummy, Joni Faith Saloom, answered the telephone for Julian to at least receive a happy birthday, I love you message from Joni, who was the only consistent caretaker prior to May 08, 2012. Joni, a former teacher, has been kept away from any and all participation in he/r son’s academic life at Tomball’s Lakewood Elementary School (Principal Royce Aston), which sits around the corner from the beautiful home where Joni raised Julian alone during his toddler and pre-kindergarten years.  This is “mis-education.”

Fair Use Notice and Disclaimer


Expressly, author of this blog Is NOT a lawyer, nor a legal practitioner.  Expressly, there is no “legal advice” on this blog or in this post.

This post is made in good faith and for deterrent purposes against child abusers, alleged child abusers, and those who would maternally alienate fit, loving mothers and children from one another.